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Abstract
Metanationality, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights: 
lessons from Ghana for South Africa
The Ghanaian philosopher, Kwame Gyekye, defends a concept of 
metanationality (nationality-transcending specific ethnic groups, yet accom­
modating them all on a basis of equality), which he regards as eminently 
suitable for application in multicultural societies. Metanationality dis­
tinguishes between first- and second-tier solidarity. Second-tier solidarity 
entails commitment to the democratic institutions of the state and a system 
of rights to which individuals bear title. These rights include social and 
economic rights which are backup rights ensuring effective use of political 
rights. This system of comprehensive democracy requires that the 
constitution does not differentiate between citizens, though individuals are 
differentiated at first-tier solidarity with reference to the communocultural 
groups with whom they identify. Gyekye succeeds in marrying rights to a 
politics of the common good. This success is due largely to a novel feature 
of his philosophy -  the equal moral standing of individual and community -  
and to a limitation clause designed to limit liberty whenever it is necessary 
to protect the requirements of equality. Gyekye’s attempt to find a 
reciprocal balance between rights and the common good is instructive for 
attempts in South Africa to effect a just dispensation for all citizens.
1. Introduction
Kwame Gyekye defends a left-communitarianism critically founded on his 
view that the individual and her community are morally of equal value or 
standing, an idea Gyekye calls their equiprimordiality. The equiprimor- 
diality of person and community is primarily a structural defense against
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the possibility of cultural oppression of any ethnic group by another. The 
recognition of equal moral standing for individuals alongside their com­
munities creates a public space for internal criticism of moral practices 
which runs on a capacity for moral agency partially independent of the 
formative influences of community. The idea, central to Gyekye’s com- 
munitarianism (the idea that the community has moral significance), that 
neither the common interest nor individual rights are by themselves 
absolutely overriding or trumps, determines that the political community 
and its institutions are never simply the neutral umpires of individually 
chosen goods. This non-neutral stand is, in Gyekye, a guarantee of free­
dom from oppression.
Gyekye’s left-communitarianism is inherently paternalistic. State inter­
ference in the private domain is not only permissible but justifiable from 
the point of view of capacity building. Gyekye’s sense of justification 
connects with his concern that Africa should remain the master of her 
own fate, and that the African states might retain a hold on their choice of 
the shape of modernity provided that their governments create conditions 
conducive to cultural development and technological growth. This pater­
nalism creates space for a liberal critique, yet its possibility does not 
dampen Gyekye’s enthusiasm for communitarianism. From his perspec­
tive, a defense of communitarianism -  as he modifies it with additions 
from liberalism -  is the appropriate response to the over-individualistic 
liberal treatment of the person and her community, and to the sense of 
alienation that accompanies individuals’ experience of the liberal state. 
Gyekye’s attempt to construct a left-communitarianism on the basis of 
the equiprimordiality of the person and her community contains an 
immanent critique of the liberal alternative. Specifically, the community 
and the individuals who make it up are equally significant loci of value. 
As a source of value the community acts as a restraint on the excesses 
of individualism, particularly with respect to claim-rights affecting the 
extent of liberty. Gyekye’s anti-Lockean stand is apparent in the limita­
tions affecting the right to dispose of one’s property (including one’s 
body, one’s life and one’s talents) as one pleases. Individuals have 
responsibilities to their communities regarding the manner in which they 
conduct their lives, and to what ends they apply their talents. Indeed, in 
Gyekye’s communitarian setting they are morally accountable to the 
community in this respect. In view of this public institutions have the 
power to shape the common good and to determine how it might best be 
served (with due consideration to the side constraints which the moral 
rights of individuals generate). Yet the values which the community 
espouses are never incontestably or selfevidently right or true. Ultimately 
value is determined in a contested dialogue between community mem­
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bers and even between specific individuals and their communities. This 
is to say that for Gyekye value is ultimately relational.
My object is to give an account of Gyekye’s communitarianism and of the 
critique of liberalism it contains. I shall not be concerned with liberal 
objections to Gyekye’s views and so will largely ignore the issue except 
where it affects points of exegesis.
2. Rights of the collective and individual rights
2.1 The associative concept of community and the relational 
concept of personhood
Since much of what Gyekye attempts to defend as rights (of the 
individual and of the community) turn on his conception of the collectivity,
I begin by making some distinctions. Gyekye (1997:39-47) favours the 
associative concept of community, which he implicitly contrasts with the 
aggregative concept. Association is the view that the collective is 
constituted by patterns of interpersonal relationships and indeed, that the 
association is structured by these relationships and the (sociological, 
cultural, traditional) rules they imply (Bird, 1999:87-90). Individuals com­
prise the collective; they (re)produce the relationships which make up 
their association. How they do that marks the difference between strong 
and weak association, as we shall shortly see. According to the associa­
tive view community is “a group of persons linked by interpersonal 
bonds, which are not necessarily biological, who consider themselves 
primarily as members of a group and who share common goods, values, 
and interests. The notion of a shared life -  shared purposes, interests, 
and understandings of the good" (Gyekye, 1997:42) is central to this 
conception.
Ontologically the community is “a reality in itse lf (Gyekye, 1997:42), 
grounded in the “fundamentally relational character of the person and the 
interdependence of human individuals arising out of their natural 
sociality" (Gyekye, 1997:38). Relationality and sociality are necessary 
attributes. “The person is constituted, at least partly, by social relation­
ships in which he necessarily finds himself (Gyekye, 1997:38). Members 
share a way of life; they have “intellectual and ideological as well as 
emotional attachments to their shared goals and values and ... they are 
ever ready to pursue and defend them" (Gyekye, 1997:42). Their 
relationships are regulated by culturally reinforced “reciprocities, 
comprehensive interactions, and mutual sympathies and responsibilities” 
(Gyekye, 1997:42) which run on “a loyalty and commitment to the 
community" (Gyekye, 1997:43) experienced as “the desire to advance its 
interests” (Gyekye, 1997:43). A community structured by such relation­
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ships and loyalties imply that in assuming the normative point of view an 
agent is primarily concerned with the instantiation and reproduction of 
these relationships and loyalties (Bird, 1999:90).
Gyekye rejects the view that community is "a mere association based on 
a contract of individuals whose interests and ends are contingently 
congruent” (Gyekye, 1997:42). This view lacks the strong normative 
dimension which deliberate pursuit of the common good possesses 
simply because, in the appropriate social context, “Individuals are con­
cerned solely and primarily with the promotion of their own interests, 
ends, and well-being and pay attention to the common good of the 
society only sporadically’’ (Gyekye, 1997:43). Gyekye hereby rejects the 
aggregative sense of the collectivity. To construe the collective as an 
aggregate of individuals is to treat individuals as separate units who 
contribute arithmetically to the whole (Bird, 1999:86-89), and who have 
interests only contingently connected. (Gyekye ascribes the aggregative 
view to Western theorists like Rawls and Dworkin.)
Strong and weak association construe the relation between individuals 
and the collectivities with which they identify as a “'membership' relation” 
(Bird, 1999:85). Strong and weak association distinguish two sets of 
“membership” relation: the relation between individuals and the com­
munity that they collectively constitute, and the relation between the 
community and the political institutions of the state that act on behalf of 
the community whenever the rights of individuals are at issue (Bird, 
1999:86). This distinction draws a line between the public and private 
domains which are significant for theories that entertain the notion of 
individual rights in some way. Now, if individuals count as moral agents 
only because of their membership of a group, and act as moral agents 
only through the marital, paternal, and maternal structures of their 
groups, the relationships between individual members are said to be 
irreducible (Bird’s term -  1999:87), and this is a characteristic of strong 
association. Strong association is a feature of Wiredu's theory, given the 
moral significance he attaches to kinship groups and lineages1. This 
does not mean, as Bird (1999:88) makes clear, that “the relationships 
defining an association ... exist apart from individuals”; strong association 
makes a claim “about how individuals compromise ... [the] collective”
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1 See Wiredu (1996:34-42). Wiredu does make provision for individual rights vested in 
human beings in virtue of their intrinsic worth as human beings. This aspect of his 
theory makes provision for rights owed to strangers which, as a class of rights, is 
distinct from the ‘role’-rights observed by the Akan. Akans, of course, also owe each 
other rights of respect vested in the intrinsic worth of persons, a right Wiredu defends 
as a universal norm founded in the biology of the human species.
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(Bird, 1999:88). Bird (1999:89) explains as follows. Suppose a heap of 
Lego bricks could be assembled in a model of the Empire State Building. 
The model and the heap are composed of the same bricks, each in a 
different way. In the model “each brick ... has a specific role to play in 
replicating certain features of the Empire State Building. ... [The bricks] 
compose the model by being there in a certain spatial relationship with 
each other. If that model is to replicate the Empire State Building, those 
spatial relationships must be present: without them, it will fail to be a 
model of the building”. The spatial relationships are irreducible, just as 
the interpersonal relationships on which role-rights are based in Wiredu’s 
theory are morally irreducible. Adopting the moral point of view means 
instantiating and reproducing those (kinship and lineage) relationships 
and no others (Bird, 1999:90).
But as soon as individuals count morally as autonomous units apart from 
and independent of structured relationships, and qua autonomous units 
enjoy moral standing of equal value as that which they have in structured 
relationships, irreducibility is compromised. In Gyekye these relationships 
are organic but not structured by ethnic loyalties (Gyekye, 1997:104­
105). Irreducible relationships tend to diminish the moral significance of 
the distinction between the two sets of membership relations mentioned 
above. The rules by which individuals act and those by which the 
collective act tend to be the same set (Bird, 1999:91) which means that 
rights are easily transferred from individuals to the collective (Bird, 1999: 
91). Social contexts in which irreducibility is more or less compromised 
tend to exploit the distinction to demarcate an uncompromisable space 
for individual rights. A disanalogy between private and public agency is 
apparent (Bird, 1999:91) together with a concomitant disjunction between 
the rules by which individuals and collectives are held to act (Bird, 1999: 
91). Individuals are separable from the relationships in which they 
participate without loss of moral status, but in spite of the space created 
for disanalogy and disjunction in Gyekye’s theory, the collective interest 
may in specific contexts become overriding. An agent’s status as moral 
agent is not exhausted by her being an individual-as-unit; she bears title 
to rights but she also has responsibilities to the collective.
For Bird (1999:94) the ultimate contrast between the aggregative and the 
associative conceptions reduces to the proposal that the latter “privileges 
specific interpersonal relationships over the interests of individuals 
considered in isolation”. I maintain that this has a significant implication 
for what it means to adopt the moral point of view. Bird (1999:90) 
supplies a comprehensive statement of this implication which I here 
adopt. An account of public agency may be said to be symmetrical if “the 
normative point of view under which the public agency acts on behalf of 
the collectivity is analogous to the normative point of view under which
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individual agents act on their own behalf, i.e. if “there are analogies 
between justified individual agency and justified collective or public 
agency” (Bird, 1999:95). Balancing this symmetry (Bird’s term -  1999:90) 
against the provision made for disanalogy and disjunction in support of 
the idea of equiprimordiality is a major challenge for Gyekye. Gyekye 
appeals to a notion of rights found in “natural” as opposed to “voluntary” 
membership of society as exemplified by, for instance, social contract 
theory. According to Gyekye (1997:62) rights “belong primarily and 
irreducibly to the individual” and they exist “as part of the structure of a 
people’s moral beliefs and values” (Gyekye, 1997:62). One particularly 
significant belief about what is valuable in the human being is that he 
has, by his very nature, “the qualities that will dispose ... [him] to function 
at his best in human society and realize his potentials to the full” 
(Gyekye, 1997:63). But this means that his rights “may not be asserted 
or insisted on with belligerency, for communal values such as generosity, 
compassion, reciprocities, and mutual sympathies may be considered 
more important than one’s rights” (Gyekye, 1997:62).
The notion of the “equal moral standing” (Gyekye, 1997:41) of indivi- 
duals-as-units and individuals-in-relation will shortly be qualified. I wish to 
show how Gyekye demonstrates its possibility through his concept of the 
interdependence of person and community. The individual, opines 
Gyekye (1997:37), is embedded in a set of necessary social relation­
ships, but she is not wholly constituted by them. “Other things” (Gyekye, 
1997:53), specifically “rationality, having a moral sense and capacity for 
virtue and, hence, for evaluating and making moral judgements” 
(Gyekye, 1997:53), which Gyekye (1997:53) regards as being “capable 
of choice” also play a role. The recognition of a “mental feature” (Gyekye, 
1997:53) in the biology of the human species which is in principle 
independent of modification by the socio-cultural milieu, means that the 
individual-as-unit can “distance herself from ... [inherited values and 
practices], and thus be in a position to take a critical look at it” (Gyekye, 
1997:52). “Self-assertion” (Gyekye, 1997:54) implies that the community 
is not invested with an “all-engulfing moral authority” (Gyekye, 1997:47­
48). And this leaves space for the individual to participate in the 
determination of her personhood and identity, which she does through 
the contribution she makes to her culture. “Human culture ... is shaped 
through the activities o f ... individual human beings” (Gyekye, 1997:56). 
On the other hand sociality is a “natural” (Gyekye, 1997:39) feature of the 
human being -  a feature which complements the inadequacy and 
insufficiency of the individual-as-unit in the sense that it supplies what is 
needed “for the realization of her potentials and basic needs” (Gyekye, 
1997:38). The community “alone constitutes the contexts, the social or 
cultural space, in which the actualization of the potentials of the individual
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can take place” (Gyekye, 1997:39). Most importantly, the attainment of 
the excellences “definitive of full personhood” (Gyekye, 1997:49) is 
earned in the ethical arena. It is an individual’s moral achievements that 
earns her the status of a person (Gyekye, 1997:51).
2.2 Equiprimordiality qualified
In as much as the self is an autonomous, assertive being the recognition 
of individual rights by communitarian morality is conceptually required 
(Gyekye, 1997:64), and in as much as sociality is a feature of the self 
there is justification for giving “equal attention to the other values of the 
community, all (or some) of which may occasionally be regarded as 
overriding” (Gyekye, 1997:65), a matter Gyekye (1997:65) believes “de­
rives from the logic of the communitarian theory itself’. Gyekye advances 
two main arguments reminiscent of those advanced by Will Kymlicka 
(1989). The community constitutes the context of identity. An agent 
“comes to know who she is in the context of relationships with others” 
(Gyekye, 1997:43). It also constitutes the context of choice: “the range of 
goals in life from which she can choose ... [are] the function of the 
[cultural] structure” (Gyekye, 1997:39). Members are morally responsible 
for the preservation of the cultural structure. The justification is twofold, 
deriving from the fact that the individual-as-unit is not self-sufficient 
(Gyekye, 1997:38), and from “our understanding of what social and 
solidaristic life requires” (Gyekye, 1997:67). It requires, opines Gyekye, 
“that each individual should work for the good of all” (Gyekye, 1997:67). 
Harmony, solidarity, mutual reciprocities and sympathies (Gyekye, 
1997:65), being part of communitarian beliefs about what things have 
value, require “altruistically freighted” (Gyekye, 1997:67) motivations.
Gyekye (1997:67-69) contrasts this notion of rights with responsibilities. 
Rights are “a means of expressing an individual’s talents, capacities and 
identity” (Gyekye, 1997:62). But rights do not necessarily imply corres­
ponding obligations (Gyekye, 1997:68), so the responsibilities that 
individual members have towards the community (Gyekye, 1997:66)2 are 
not rights-claims of others -  “they are not based on the recognition of 
others’ rights” (Gyekye, 1997:69), but rather on our “moral re­
sponsiveness to ... [others’] needs” (Gyekye, 1997:68). Gyekye’s “ethic 
of responsibility” (Gyekye, 1997:66) enjoins moderation: individuals 
should “not to be obsessed with insisting on their rights” (Gyekye,
2 See Gyekye (1997:66) Responsibilities “include the responsibility to help others in 
distress, the responsibility to show concern for the needs and welfare of others, the 
responsibility not to harm others, and so on” Generally, Gyekye has in mind “a caring 
attitude or conduct that one feels ... with respect to the well-being o f ... other persons”.
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1997:66) and he warns that an absence of sensitivity towards their 
responsibilities entitles the community to take steps which may involve 
“abridging individual rights” (Gyekye, 1997:65). Individual rights are “not 
absolute, though important” (Gyekye, 1997:65), but the preservation of a 
community’s integrity is more important and is hence the reason why “the 
common good ... [may on appropriate occasions] justifiably trump 
individual rights” (Gyekye, 1997:66). Though the political community is 
not the locus of collective rights, the responsibilities citizens owe their 
community has “a status equal to that of rights” (Gyekye, 1997:67).
2.3 The common good
Individual rights, then, do not dilute individual commitment to cultural 
views which define their identity. They cannot without justifiable cause be 
“set at nought by the communal structure” (Gyekye, 1997:63), because 
they are an expression of the autonomy every human being needs “to 
function at his best in human society” (Gyekye, 1997:63). If so what 
constitutes the common good? Gyekye (1997:45) conceives of it as a 
“good ... which is essential for the ... basic functioning of the individual in 
human society”, and identifies it with a set of goods which all individuals 
desire, a set of goods “that is essentially good for human beings as such 
[freedom, respect, dignity, security, and satisfaction]” (Gyekye, 1997:46). 
This notion is conceptually linked to “essentialism” (Gyekye, 1997:142), 
the view that “human life has certain basic defining features and, hence, 
certain basic human needs necessary for individuals i f they are to 
function as human beings" (Gyekye, 1997:142). Gyekye (1997:273) sees 
these needs as part of “a core of common or universal ideas and values”.
Though the common good is a substantive good, it leaves space for 
individual goods. Gyekye (1997:46) sees no “conceptual opposition” 
between the common good and individual goods, and no reactionary 
threat from the common interest to a “reevaluation of inherited values 
and practices” (Gyekye, 1997:53). Indeed, Gyekye believes that ideally 
there should be a balance between the common interest and individual 
goods, and that the political institutions of the state best maintains this 
balance. As Gyekye interprets this, political institutions cannot be neutral 
with respect to individually chosen goods: they should encourage other- 
regarding actions as valuable in themselves -  thus serving as the locus 
for a normative point of view under which it is justifiable to regulate 
interpersonal interaction. The interpersonal realm of self-regarding ac­
tions is then not wholly selfregarding. In this realm individuals are free to 
act according to the range of options their cultures make available. But 
the principles by which they organize their private lives do not exactly 
mirror the principles by which the state acts on behalf of the collectivity. A
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strong strain of asymmetry in the sense Bird (1999:91) has in mind 
springs from this separation of private and public agency.
In an asymmetrical view ... the principles by which governments 
determine the appropriate action for the collectivity as a whole will bear 
no particular resemblance to those invoked by private agents as they 
lead and pursue their own lives and projects.
But Gyekye’s disjunctions and disanalogies are not complete because a 
notion of the common good, a substantive one, may on appropriate 
occasion be overriding. The norm of the common good insinuates itself 
into individual self-reflection in a way which attenuates conceptions of 
particularity, difference and identity, thus shaping commitments to act in 
certain approved ways. Gyekye’s state paternalism will be examined 
shortly. For the moment I wish to stress that asymmetry (Bird’s term -  
1999:91) is not fully realized. Gyekye (1997:45) says explicitly that the 
common good does not consist of, and cannot be derived from, “the 
goods or preferences of particular individuals" and that it is “not a 
surrogate for the sum of the different individual goods”. Rather, the 
common good is a “substrate of commonly shared values and self­
understandings" (Gyekye, 1997:46) which underpin organized human 
society. Its overridingness (when appropriate) is exactly that feature of 
his thinking which distinguishes him from Western individual liberal 
theorists (Gyekye, 1997:103).
2.4 Persons-as-units and persons-in-relation: who is the locus of 
the value?
What does it mean to say that the common good is overriding? Though, 
as I have maintained, asymmetry is not complete, individual rights are 
nevertheless genuine. Their existence mean that there are culturally 
endorsed rules and principles for individuals to formulate life plans which 
are not analogous to the rules and principles which specify how the 
collectivity should be ordered. Private and public agency, then, are 
disanalogous. Yet, in Gyekye, this does not entail that the collective plan 
cannot be accorded priority over individuals’ plans (whenever 
appropriate), and, indeed, be overriding.
Gyekye’s theory is in a crucial respect standardly communitarian. The 
arguments he advances regarding the cultural matrix as contexts of 
choice and identity is evidence for him that the collective interest 
overrides individual goods in cases of conflict. Gyekye (1997:40) formu­
lates the foundation of this thesis as the claim that “the cultural 
community must be held as [ontologically] prior to the individual”. In 
Gyekye the overriding normative force of community and the common 
good derives from this ontological priority. Yet the common good is that
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set of goods which all humans universally desire, and which are essential 
for the “basic functioning of the individual in human society” (Gyekye, 
1997:45). Now, one way of interpreting this view is to say that these are 
no goals or values which are independently or irreducibly collective. 
Indeed, the only goals which the collectivity pursues are those, as Bird 
(1999:51) points out, “whose value is fully reducible to individual interests 
and values”. If this is correct, the cultural space I referred to above in 
which individual rights exist consists in the cultural constraint that, all 
other things being equal, collective aspirations are really individual 
interests and goals for which the collectivity provides the means of 
expression.
But, this interpretation misses an essential part of Gyekye’s meaning. 
Gyekye wants to say that, in addition, there are forms of value which are 
irreducibly social. In particular the cultural matrix as provider of contexts 
of choice and identity makes possible the (self)understandings that 
render human action meaningful, and cannot, as Bird (1999:67) puts it, 
“be fully accounted for simply as a means to individual ends”. Rather, 
they are independently valuable goods whose “'locus is a society’” -  
independently, that is, of their utility to individuals. On this view, there are 
values assignable to societies as such, and they play a role in 
individuals’ appraisals of how well or how badly they fare under their 
specific collective arrangements.
There is a useful way of showing how these two interpretations differ. 
The effect of collective arrangements on the lives of individuals, and the 
state-of-affairs which make up these arrangements, should be distin­
guishable (Bird, 1999:69). There is a sense in which the set of goods 
which make up the common good -  “freedom, respect, dignity, security 
and satisfaction” (Gyekye, 1997:46) -  constitute a collective state-of- 
affairs under which individuals live and which impacts on their lives. 
There is also a sense in which specific states of an individual is 
distinguishable from the collective state-of-affairs (Bird, 1999:69). Internal 
states of individuals are states “that subsist without any relation to 
anything outside the individual” (Bird, 1999:20). External states are 
“possible individual states relative to something outside” (Bird, 1999:20). 
Enjoying desire satisfaction, for instance, in being treated with respect in 
recognition of your dignity is not a collective state. But, now, as Bird 
(1999:69) points out, being treated with respect refers to a “collective 
state-of-affairs”, in particular “a relation between an individual and the 
agents and institutions with which she is transacting”. So is being treated 
with respect “an individual as opposed to a collective state-of-affairs”? 
(Bird, 1999:69). For Bird (1999:70) the matter turns on whether it is 
possible to draw a “meaningful distinction between the value of states of 
individuals and the value of states of the collectivity sui generis”. If being
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treated with respect is an intrinsically valuable state of an individual, it 
follows, opines Bird (1999:70), that any collective pattern of interaction 
that instantiates it is an intrinsically valuable state. In this case the 
pattern of interaction carries value by itself; the question of its value is 
settled “without having to refer to any internal states of the individual” 
(Bird, 1999:71). But things turn out differently if we restrict the ascription 
of intrinsically valuable states to the internal states of individuals. If, then, 
we ascribe intrinsic value to the internal state of having our desires 
satisfied (as Gyekye in effect does by making desire-satisfaction a 
component good of the common good), and it turns out that being treated 
with respect results in desire-satisfaction for individuals (because such 
treatment recognizes their dignity qua humans), it follows, opines Bird 
(1999:20), that a collectivity in which individuals treat each other with 
respect will have value. However, according to Bird (1999:70) “this 
collective pattern of interaction will not be independently or irreducibly 
valuable ... It will inherit its value from that of the individual desires that 
are serviced by it’'.
On the one hand Gyekye (1997:101-106) writes as if he affirms the view 
that being treated with (equal) respect is valuable (only) as a means to 
the realization of valuable internal states, and that the collective 
arrangements in which such treatment is instantiated need not be 
valuable sui generis. Recognition as a person, and the moral satisfaction 
that this brings about, does not depend on an individual’s “'ethnic badge’ 
... it is instead his moral worth or value, intrinsic to him as an individual 
human being, as well as his personal character that will determine or 
influence people’s attitudes toward him” (Gyekye, 1997:104). On the 
other hand he writes as if he affirms the view that receiving recognition 
and satisfaction refers to an external state of the individual in as much as 
the appropriate treatment assumes a moral context in which one member 
stands in a particular relation to others, and that the value of the 
treatment resides in the relations that pertain among the individuals who 
constitute the community: “[Metanationality] ... recognizes the equal 
worth and dignity of every individual member of the community ... [but] 
does not necessarily hold that individual rights are invariably to be 
privileged over communal interests and goals” (Gyekye, 1997:103).
Thus the question arises whether Gyekye (1997:41) is serious about the 
claim that “the most satisfactory way to recognize the claims of the 
community and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of an equal 
moral standing? The matter of equiprimordality seems to arise from a 
preference for a specific kind of social organization, one in which the 
collective arrangements are such that the political institutions of the state 
are changed with respecting everyone’s equal right to a private realm of 
choice and activity, yet is entitled to intervene when individuals’ entitle-
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merits or claimed entitlements undermine the common interest. Gyekye 
interprets this intervention in a moral sense: the institutions of the political 
community are charged with instructing citizens in “competence to 
pursue the right thing” (Gyekye, 1997:55), i.e. adherence to his “ethic of 
responsibility”. Now, intervention can only mean that any limitation 
placed on rights will be equally limited for ail concerned in the interest of 
the well-being of the whole, not that some persons’ lives are intrinsically 
more valuable than others and that others’ prospects may be sacrificed 
to theirs. As I read Gyekye, everyone is equally entitled to the benefits of 
a private realm of social life; unequal entitlement would constitute a 
reason to reject the collective order which instantiates the inequality. On 
this reading of the relative value of individual rights and the common 
good, the asymmetry ascribed to Gyekye above is not complete because 
the private realm is not absolutely inviolable. In arguing for this collective 
order Gyekye is taking ultimate value to inhere in states of the collectivity 
as such.
Yet, I suspect that there is a deeper reason for Gyekye’s preference. 
Gyekye sanctions a collective order which permits external states of the 
individual to be instantiated in a way Western liberals standardly reject. 
Gyekye’s commitment to something like solidarity as a good in his 
conception of the common good, seems intrinsic to that good, such that 
granting others (equal) recognition as members can be, from his 
communitarian perspective, sufficient by itself to motivate a principled 
rejection of patterns of denial and marginalization. The available 
evidence suggest that the justification is the view that the individual 
human being is by herself inadequate and incomplete, dependent for her 
flourishing on a cultural matrix. The self is a person only as socially 
embedded individual. Personhood is content-full, dependent on a thick 
conception of the notion of “the social” -  one in which, as Bird (1999:79) 
puts it “‘the hidden hand of the community’ is given free rein to paint a 
more colorful, less rigidly modernist, social landscape of customs, shared 
histories, cultural understandings and moral traditions”.
3. Domination, resistance and revision
3.1 Welfare paternalism and the distribution of liberty
Gyekye is arguing that equiprimordiality is compatible with a communi­
tarian preference for a thick conception of the social and a maximal 
conception of the competence of the state. Equiprimordiality creates a 
private space for individual rights founded on the idea that there is a set 
of human needs, common to all humanity, which create legitimate 
expectations of fulfilment in society. This set is the core of universal 
values needed to ensure human flourishing or well-being in any society.
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In this private space3 individuals are morally immune from interference 
by others, though not from paternalistic interference by the state. The 
promotion of valuable social goals can, when necessary, override 
individual rights, though, as indicated above, if rights are restricted, the 
restriction applies equally4. It is permissible to restrict rights if the 
restriction is necessary to secure a desired outcome, one which benefits 
individuals equally. I shall call this the equal restriction principle (ERP)5
I take it that ERP correctly represents Gyekye’s view. It represents a 
decisive break with African tradition (Eze,1997:173). ERP implies that 
individuals are not entirely free to specify the private sphere as they 
please. Individual action is subject to correction by the state if it interferes 
with the realization of the common good, with this proviso6 that a 
restriction on one is a restriction on all, so that the good of some are not 
(unjustly) sacrificed in order to promote the (claimed) good of others. The 
realization of the common good may be hindered if fundamental rights,
i.e. rights based on universal human needs -  to freedom, respect, 
dignity, security and satisfaction (Gyekye, 1997:46) -  are obstructed. 
These rights can be obstructed by individual action, for instance, through 
coercion, which denies to some an equal entitlement to liberty and 
security or through non-recognition, which denies to some an equal 
entitlement to respect and dignity. In these cases remedial interference
3 Young (1990:120) argues that the distinction between the private and the public 
domains need not be a "social division” -  each with 'different kinds of institutions, 
activities, and human attributes". It is not clear whether Gyekye has a social division in 
mind His concept of a heterogeneous public is much like Young’s in conforming to 
two principles: “no persons, actions, or aspects of a person's life should be forced into 
privacy ... and ... no social institution or practices should be excluded a priori from 
being a proper subject for public discussion and expression”.
4 Rhoda (1990:179) thinks that “African scholars who advocate a distinct African 
concept of human rights seem to be [preoccupied with] the right of the individual to 
separate him -  (or, as noted, frequently her-) self from the group, not to assert claims 
against the state”. Though Gyekye is advancing an African conception through his 
notion of the equiprimordiality of person and community, individual rights are, for him, 
claims individuals assert against the state They assert their rights claims as 
individuals, but their rights protect the non-ethnic communocultural identifying groups 
to which they belong.
5 ERP represents a decisive break with tradition -  what Eze (1997:173) scathingly calls 
Wiredu’s "return to the source” strategy of doing philosophy. Meyerson (1997:xxiii) 
discusses a similar limitation clause -  Section 36(1) -  in the new South African 
constitution.
6 The point at issue here is one defined by Lomasky (1987:19). “Rights are side 
constraints that preclude the sacrifice of one individual for the sake of another in order 
to maximize impersonal value”.
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by the state is restricted to restoring equality, and may not exceed the 
side constraints (Lomasky’s term -  1987:19) which rights generate, i.e., 
interference may not frustrate the expected satisfaction of some for the 
sake of some optimal sum of impersonal satisfactions. So, though not 
every claim to a right is inviolable, the equal entitlement of everyone to 
basic rights are. Though the notion of liberty is inseparably connected to 
an equality of access to the other goods that constitute the common 
good, to secure the desired equality it is necessary that liberty be 
restricted, and this Gyekye attempts to effect by proposing a self­
imposed restraint. Individuals “may not be obsessed with insisting on 
their rights, knowing that insistence on their rights could divert attention 
from responsibilities that they, as members of the communitarian society, 
should strongly feel they have towards other members” (Gyekye, 
1997:66). In Gyekye’s view an equal distribution of basic rights is 
realized if individuals act with restraint, which they have good reason to 
do, opines Gyekye, because they have good reason to preserve the 
cultural structure that provides their contexts of identity and choice.
In Gyekye liberty and restraint are conceptually connected as we shall 
shortly see. Individuals have an area of moral space -  the private domain
-  immune from the interference of others, but within this space they are 
not fully free to do as they wish because the state may interfere to bring 
about their well-being. They have a higher-order interest in being free; 
freedom is of such value that the state sets “external limits” (Bird's term -  
1999:116) to the violation of liberty. These limits apply to violations -  
which may result from the intentional action of an agent, such that she 
can be held morally responsible for the harm done to others, and also 
violations which result from state action itself, such as sacrificing some 
person’s rights for the sake of a greater overall utility. The harm done to 
others are the consequence of coercions. Bird, following Nozick (1972) 
and Raz (1986), treats coercive obstacles as “obstacles caused by 
human action”. Among this class of obstacles Bird (1999:117) 
distinguishes interferences. An obstacle becomes an interference “when 
it hinders, thwarts or meddles with some activity or project which an 
agent chooses to engage in, or in which an agent has some particular 
interest or whose continued availability is of real concern to the relevant 
agent”. This category of interference is critical. Being compelled to 
submit to the dictates of compulsory education for all children below a 
certain age counts as a coercion but not an interference. Compelling all 
property owners to sell their property7 and donate the proceeds to a fund 
for starving children interferes with the institution of property rights which
7 The example derives from Sen (1988, 4:57-68).
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has significant value for many people, and this counts as an interference 
and a coercion.
In Gyekye no one has the freedom to renege on the ethic of re­
sponsibility i.e. on actions and behaviours “conducive to the promotion of 
the well-being of others” (Gyekye, 1999:50). Individuals act morally 
correctly, and thus are worthy of being accorded respect, when they act 
as autonomous agents, i.e. when they freely submit to the required 
restraint. But this means that they accept and internalize the authority of 
justified communally based decisions which are initially external to 
themselves. At play here is a concept of liberty which equates liberty with 
a self-restraining motivational capacity. State action aimed at inculcating 
the desired restraint may, in view of the connection between liberty and 
restraint, be seen not only as compatible with liberty but also as 
education for the realization of liberty. The liberty at issue here is positive 
liberty, the freedom to do things rather than the freedom from 
interference or coercion by others. The notion of “liberty to” is the 
“capacity building” conception favoured by Gyekye. It is the key, opines 
Gyekye (1997:141), to integrating “political liberty (individual freedom) 
and social welfare” in a sociopolitical framework which gives concrete 
expression to the idea of “social and political equality” (Gyekye, 
1997:141). Gyekye (1997:142) advocates a “comprehensive conception 
of democracy” which will give recognition to social and economic rights, 
on par with political rights, as necessary conditions of the functioning of 
humans in society (Gyekye, 1997:142)8. “Political rights cannot be 
divorced from economic well-being: a person may be free politically and 
yet not free to pursue and realize his or her chosen purposes in life 
because the necessary conditions are denied him or her” (Gyekye, 
1997:193).
All citizens must have equal opportunity to influence political decisions, 
yet the capacity to make effective use of such opportunities vary widely 
in proportion to differences in wealth and social standing (Gyekye, 
1997:142-143). Liberty deficits are best righted by institutions which 
establish a minimum threshold for equality regarded as adequate for 
public functioning and below which citizens cannot reasonably be 
expected to influence the outcome of deliberation. The minimum thres­
hold must be guaranteed as a way of protecting the weak against the 
strong and this requires restraint to ensure that the weak are not
8 For a similar view see Ryan (1989:117). According to Ryan (1989:162) the right to 
equal treatment is inseparable from its institutional context and the “interrelational 
character of social wealth”. The doctrine of rights should be understood as "a doctrine 
of exercisable rights”.
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alienated from the capacity building conditions of choice9. The equal 
entitlement to economic and social rights -  “food, shelter, security, good­
will, friendship, and self-respect” (Gyekye, 1997:48) introduces a wel- 
farist stance into Gyekye’s paternalism. As I read Gyekye, he attempts to 
maintain a reciprocal balance between responsibility and liberty. Clearly, 
the attempt to secure equal access to political rights by guaranteeing 
economic and social rights restricts liberty in the interests of equality, yet 
it promotes equal liberties overall, and this is in keeping with the ERP. It 
is permissible to restrict liberty but not in excess of what is required to 
secure the equal liberty of citizens. So the side constraints of the right to 
liberty are not exceeded.
In Gyekye the “internal boundaries” (Bird, 1999:34) or “core elements" 
(Bird, 1999:32) within the sphere of private action towards which 
individuals are constrained to act in particular ways, are significant; the 
line dividing private and public space is then not absolute, yet there are 
“external limits” (Bird, 1999:32) to individual action defined by rights 
specifying equal liberties for all. To capture Gyekye’s meaning it is 
necessary to add that the dividing line seems to be negotiable for 
individuals. What they treat as private seems to be a matter open to 
choice. If correct, this accords with Young’s view (1990:120) who argues 
that the distinction between the private and the public domains need not 
be a “social division”, each with “different kinds of institutions, activities, 
and human attributes”.
The comprehensive theory of democracy, coupled as it is to a philosophy 
of restraint, is intended to alter individuals’ attitudes to their interests so 
that the requirements of equality are met. Because they have a higher 
order interest in solidarity, they will be less inclined to pursue interests 
incompatible with the equal moral status of others. The source of 
appropriate moral relations between individuals, then, is to be found in 
the natural sociality of individuals, a locus within them which disposes 
them to submit to restraint. Restraint maintains balance between the 
private and public realms and determines to some extent where the line 
should be drawn. Indeed, where it is drawn depends on how much 
restraint they are willing to accept, i.e. it depends on internal 
relationships between individuals’ private and public identities. Intra­
personal relations and interpersonal ones are reciprocally connected 
through the willingness to submit to restraint. This means that the 
requirements of liberty and equality are interlinked. Moral properties, on 
this view, are associative -  a pattern of relations between persons -  to
9 Bohman (1997) argues for much the same concept
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the extent that persons suppress interests that might lead them to act in 
ways inconsistent with the requirements of solidarity and the egalitarian 
relations of dignity and respect. (I shall qualify this view somewhat later). 
The requirements of solidarity and the egalitarian relations of dignity and 
respect define an area in which negative liberties -  freedoms from 
interference by others, are exercised. The existence of this area of 
negative freedom makes possible the exercise of positive liberties, 
freedoms to do things, in ways consistent with restraint. Positive liberty is 
the capacity building conception of freedom aimed at educating 
individuals to becoming autonomous agents. Autonomy, then, consists in 
freedom to do things within the constraints determined by the require­
ments of solidarity and the egalitarian relations of dignity and respect.
But persons also act on their own behalf. Intrapersonal relations deter­
mine normative points of view from within which individuals justify acting 
in particular ways towards themselves. In Gyekye two central moral 
notions, those of positive liberty and satisfaction belong to this category. 
The principles by which individuals act on their own behalf, and those by 
which the political institutions of the state act to protect the private realm, 
are different but connected through the domain of morality which covers 
the intra- and interpersonal relations. To the extent that these principles 
are connected, to that extent Gyekye advances a symmetrical con­
ception of the relation between individual and public agency. To the 
extent that they are different, to that extent an asymmetrical conception 
becomes apparent. The presence of some aspects of symmetry means 
that asymmetry in Gyekye is not complete. His theory is a version of 
communitarianism combined with elements of liberal individualism, which 
makes him a left communitarian.
In summing up: Liberty is secured by an interactive combination of 
individual and public agency. Ultimately, Gyekye identifies freedom with 
the willingness to submit to restraint, and it is in virtue of this capacity 
that individuals gain moral standing as individuals, and as good citizens. 
It is legitimate for the state to interfere with liberty to secure the equal 
entitlement of all to the exercise of rights in the public domain. How much 
interference is tolerated is a function of what individuals consent to, given 
their commitment to protect the common interest. Public coercion is 
legitimate to prevent coercive interferences by other agents; public 
interference is legitimate to secure equality of participation in the public 
domain. Public interference is paternalistic but remedial, aimed at 
capacity building. These interferences structure a range of opportunities 
and choices which may restrict the options available to some agent in 
some way. Being prevented by such structuring from pursuing some 
activity or project in which some agent has an interest counts as an 
obstacle, though not a coercive one. The obstacle is an interference for it
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prevents realization of something valuable to someone that may have 
been attainable in some different collective organization.
3.2 Cultural oppression and moral revision
The way in which Gyekye’s preferred form of collective organization 
structures the range of opportunities and choices available to an agent 
allows only talk of an estimate of the extent to which an agent is free10. 
Berlin (1969:xxxiv-xl) defines negative freedom as the “absence of 
[culpable] obstacles to possible choices and activities”, which, when 
coupled with the thesis that culpable obstacles are coercions and 
coercions are unacceptable infractions of liberty (Berlin, 1969:122), 
implies a view of “individual inviolability” (Bird, 1999:115) of the kind 
Gyekye’s permissible interferences can accommodate. “Individual invio­
lability” is the strong thesis that the only legitimate interferences with 
individual liberty are those which are necessary to guarantee the 
inviolable and equal entitlement of each to “exercise their own capacity 
for moral autonomy” (Bird’s rendition of Kant’s base line -  1999:113), 
and to “personal and propriety security’’ (Bird’s rendition of Mill’s base 
line -  1999:129). Both exclude any permissible right to structure 
individuals’ opportunities and choices for their own benefit, or to “educate 
them into autonomy” (Bird, 1999:133). Gyekye’s incomplete asymmetry 
stops short of the inviolability criterion of these theses: a public ethos 
does intrude upon the private sphere of activity in the sense that it may 
prevent the realization of some interests which some agents may in fact 
have. Incomplete asymmetry allows for this limited penetration of 
paternalism. It also allows internal boundaries to the zone of morally 
permissible actions alongside external ones. This feature of Gyekye’s 
theory, in particular the reciprocal balance between these boundaries, I 
think, is the great strength of Gyekye’s theory.
How is the boundary drawn? I need to give a sense of the reciprocal 
balance Gyekye requires between internal and external limitations to 
liberty infractions. A culpable infraction of liberty, one for which the 
transgressor may be held morally responsible, counts as a harm. 
Meyerson (1997:15), following Nagel (1991), invokes the principle of 
“reasonable unanimity” to establish consensual grounds for the
10 Waldron (1995:109) concurs “To preserve a culture -  to insist that it must be secure, 
come what may -  is to insulate it from the very forces and tendencies that allow it to 
operate in a context of genuine choice ... The possibility of erosion of allegiance, or of 
the need to compromise a culture beyond all recognition in order to retain allegiance 
and prevent mass exodus, is the key to cultural evaluation. It is what cultures do, 
under pressure, as contexts of genuine choice".
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legitimacy of liberty limitations. Nagel asks what limitations citizens would 
agree to when the conditions under which they grant their assent were 
fair, i.e. when morally irrelevant considerations such as superior force, 
the de facto bargaining power of their economic and social status, 
greater numbers and so on were not allowed to affect the outcome of 
deliberations. If participants were “fairly situated reasonable people”, i.e. 
people “who relate to each other as possessors of equal moral status” 
(Meyerson, 1997:15)11 they would submit to “public reasons” (Meyerson, 
1997:17), “ reasons that, acknowledging the fact of everyone's equal 
status, speak to everyone’s perspective. This means ... everybody’s 
reasons”. Under these conditions state intervention to outlaw an 
unorthodox religion would count as unfair. The state “may not seek to 
prevent a harm which would not be suffered in the absence of an 
intractably disputed belief that the conduct in question is wrong from the 
religious point of view. But this is exactly what they seek to do when they 
interfere with religious freedom on the sectarian grounds that a certain 
religion is intrinsically more or less worthy of being followed, offering 
justification that ... is a justification only for those who hold certain 
intractably contested religious beliefs” (Meyerson, 1997:19).
But, when the state prohibits the followers of the unorthodox religion from 
making human sacrifices at their ceremonies “the prohibition of the 
conduct aims at the prevention of a harm -  involuntary loss of human life
-  whose status as such can be defended in terms to which any 
reasonable person ... would accord at least some weight” (Meyerson, 
1997:19). The public reasons requirement is the threshold test set by 
ERP. When the requirement is fulfilled, the threshold of justification is 
passed. “Justificatory neutrality” (Meyerson, 1997:21) is thereby main­
tained, i.e. the state is thereby disabled from enforcing intractably 
disputed beliefs, and so to recognize the “ indissoluble plurality o f ... [the] 
different perspectives” (Meyerson, 1997:19 citing Michelman, 1988: 
1518) that make up the public domain.
3.2.1 Weak cultural unity
Gyekye’s agents have a higher order interest in the preservation of the 
cultural matrix. It is part of permissible state intervention in the lives of 
citizens to secure the matrix through educational policies which educate 
citizens into endorsing the public ethos. The public ethos is a feature of 
the national identity of the nation state, of “the principles of collective
11 The perspective in question need not be independent of that made available by the 
cultural matrix. Gyekye interprets the injunction to grant equal dignity and respect as 
culturally anchored among his Akan people.
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belonging ... the set of characteristics by which a nation can collectively 
define itself and be distinctly recognized” (Gyekye, 1997:113). In the 
multicultural states of Africa the idea of a national identity should be 
understood in terms of metanationality” (Gyekye, 1997:96) as a meta­
national identity consisting of a synthesis of communocultural identities, 
developed in a “shared” environment (Gyekye, 1997:113) as opposed to 
a monolithic cultural environment in which the individual and not the 
ethnic group to which she belongs, is the “primary unit” (Gyekye, 1997: 
96). The metanational state is then a “state composed primarily of 
individuals who belong to cultural communities” (Gyekye, 1997:106). 
Communocultural identities coexist with the metanational identity which 
lies anchored in a weakly unified cultural life12, one which members of 
the component communocultural groups can identify with without 
engendering conflict with their natural (communocultural) identities. 
Gyekye (1997:107) sees the weakly unified culture as a “participatory 
culture”, a second-tier of shared meanings by which members under­
stand themselves and interpret their experiences, a political culture in the 
process of evolution which accompanies the development of a political 
identity (Gyekye, 1997:81).
How does Gyekye propose to construct the metanational state? The 
mechanism is education. In the attempt to pursue metanationality, “ethnic 
identities and their concomitant primary allegiances will have to be ... de­
emphasized” (Gyekye, 1997:83), and “primary allegiances” will have to 
be transferred from the ethnocultural community to the state, that is, from 
the parts to the whole” (Gyekye, 1997:84). The upshot is that distinct, 
particularistic forms of identification would have to, through retraining and 
re-education, lose some of their meanings to the evolving, new socio­
political dispensation. (Gyekye, 1997:87)13 “De-emphasis” (Gyekye, 
1997:88) of particularistic identities will encourage the growth of “horizon­
tal relationships” (Gyekye, 1997:89) as a complement to the vertical 
ones, the “intra-ethnic relationships” (Gyekye, 1997:90). The “politics of 
participation” (Gyekye, 1997:89) must redistribute the material as well as 
the moral goods of society. “The allocation of development resources
Metanationality, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights ...___________
12 The strong conception is the notion understood as an “ethnocultural community" 
(Gyekye, 1997:78-81).
13 Waldron (1995:109) points to an uncertainty factor that arises in assimilationist 
contexts. "We cannot guarantee at the same time the integrity of a given community 
and say that its culture (or the fate of its culture) can tell people about the value and 
viability of this particular way of life Either people leam about value from the 
dynamics of their culture and its interactions with others or their culture can operate 
for them at most as a museum display on which they can pride themselves ... There is 
something artificial about a commitment to preserve minority cultures".
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and projects must be horizontal, spread across the board”, with no one 
district or region -  and hence no one ethnocultural community left in 
limbo. (Gyekye, 1997:90). Privileging of one ethnocultural community 
over another, deriving from cultural dominance, will have to be countered 
by “the due consideration and respect that ought to be given to the 
dignity of every individual member of the state” (Gyekye, 1997:91).
Gyekye’s politics of participation is akin to Taylor’s (1994) politics of 
recognition in that “component groups would consider themselves 
culturally and politically equal, even though they may not be really equal” 
(Gyekye, 1997:92). The presumption of equality would have to be 
compromised in one respect, which will privilege one group or some 
linguistically related group, viz. the choice of a national language. “It 
would be necessary for the state to involve itself in deciding which 
language (or, languages) will be given official support” (Gyekye, 
1997:93). But privileging would have to be played with due recognition to 
the politics of difference14 in Young’s (1990) sense, i.e. without falling 
victim to the “group-neutral human capacity for self-making” (Young, 
1990:165) a fallacy which denies group difference as a category15 of 
liberation. From an individual’s perspective the emergence of “multiple 
identities” (Gyekye, 1997:95) weakens her allegiance to particular 
groups, but does not eradicate her group membership; it renders ethno­
cultural borders less well-defined, but does not render group membeship 
undesirable; her “multidimensional cultural identities” (Gyekye, 1997:104) 
enable her to elevate one or more language(s) to the level of official 
language(s) without compromise to her natural communocultural 
group,16 which remains as one basis of her identity as individual17 
(Gyekye, 1997:105).
14 Actually Taylor also recognizes the need to play the politics of difference. Van der 
Merwe (1999:322) sums up: “the current demand for recognition of cultural differences 
... involves an internalizing of the ideals of autonomy and authenticity and it leads to a 
bifurcation in the 'politics of equal recognition’ between on the one hand the demand 
for the recognition of equal rights (whatever the differences) and on the other hand the 
demand for the equal recognition of the differences themselves, in other words of that 
which is experienced as the uniquely own. The former, which Taylor calls the 'politics 
of difference’ and which I describe as the appropriation of the right to difference, 
cashes in on the credit of a universal recognition of equal rights, and changes it into 
the hard currency of recognition of the right to particular differences”.
15 See Young (1990:156-191)
16 Gyekye prefers to use the term communocultural. See his distinction between ethnic 
and communocultural groups in Gyekye (1997:77-87). “An 'ethnic' group is in fact a 
cultural community, comprising people between whom there may or may not be 
kinship bonds" (Gyekye, 1997:105).
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3.2.2 The case against oppression
3.2.2.1 Cultural oppression
Kernohan (1998:12-13) defines oppressive practices as “a set of actions 
taken not by a single person, but instead by different people each time, 
which are harmful either individually or collectively or both”. Job 
discrimination, for instance, qualifies as a practice of social oppression. 
So does the transmission of false beliefs about values, such as the belief 
in the unequal moral worth of persons prevalent in societies which 
practise gender discrimination18. Kernohan (1998:12) treats oppressive 
practices as accumulative harms, which manifest as internalized nega­
tive self-images caused and sustained by the culture in which the agent 
lives.
Cultural oppression is a form of power (Kernohan, 1998:14). Kernohan 
(1998:15), citing Galbraith (1983:25-26) sees the connection in the 
concept of implicit conditioned power.
Only a part of the subordination of women was achieved by explicit 
instruction -  explicit conditioning. Much and almost certainly more was 
(and is) achieved by the simple acceptance of what the community and 
culture have long thought right and virtuous ... This is implicit con­
ditioning, a powerful force.
Young (1992:180) calls the implicit conditioning power of a culture 
“structural or systemic” oppression which Kernohan (1998:17) compares 
to Foucault’s (1982:781) notion of “a form of power which makes 
individual subjects”. Foucault recognizes “two meanings of the word 
’subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied 
to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings 
suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to”. 
Kernohan, like Galbraith and Young, is concerned with the latter. In the 
relevant Foucaultian sense tying people “to the conception of the good 
which form their own identities ... subjects ... them to their culture” 
(Kernohan, 1998:17). Subjugation in this sense, however, is not 
necessarily harmful. Subjugation is harmful if, for any individual, it 
interferes with “the very process of forming a conception of the good” 
(Kernohan, 1998:26), in knowing her good or in implementing her 
conception of the good, which is a harm to self-respect. If she is coerced
Metanationality, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights ...___________
17 “It is possible for groups of people to speak the same language while some features of 
their cultures differ, notwithstanding the existence of many other features that may be 
similar” (Gyekye, 1997:94).
18 Both examples are borrowed from Kernohan (1998:12-13).
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(for instance, by state intervention) “into leading a life that is less good 
than she could have led without the intervention, then ... coercion will 
have harmed her highest order interest [in leading as good a life as 
possible]” (Kernohan,1998:30). But people’s lives would often go better 
“if they pursued some other good. If the state coerced them into living 
their lives in a better way, what would be wrong with that?” (Kernohan, 
1998:30).
Dworkin (1990:50), citing Locke (see Locke, 1991:33), requires an affir­
mation of the 'endorsement constraint’. “A person’s endorsement of a 
conception of the good is necessary for it to be a good for her” 
(Kernohan, 1998:30). Endorsement, in Dworkin’s sense, is only neces­
sary for the ascription of value; it does not entail that decisions are 
incorrigible. An agent may still be mistaken in the sense in which 
Sisyphus was mistaken (see Kernohan, 1999:31-32). To avoid this 
Dworkin requires the "authenticity constraint”, which, in addition to 
making the agent authorative over her conception of the good, also 
guards against deception, so that her endorsement is truly constitutive of 
who she believes herself to be, after due consideration of the merit of the 
good in a critical, reflective way (as Dworkin, 1989:486 demands). The 
authenticity constraint presupposes, as Kernohan (1999:33) makes clear, 
a “knowledge constraint”: her “highest-order interest is in coming to know 
what is best for her and then being able to implement it”. In an important 
sense, knowing what is best for her is having true beliefs about her good, 
one’s she can justify to others (Kernohan, 1998:34-35). The sense at 
issue concerns the need for revisability: her good must be revisable in 
the sense of being responsive to justifying reasons. To protect her from 
harm to her highest-order interest in leading the best life possible, we 
have to protect her highest-order interest in knowing what is best for 
herself (Kernohan, 1998:36).
How is this higher order interest best protected? Mill (1991:54-55) 
advises virtual untrammeled freedom of expression19. Dworkin (1990: 
50) believes that coercing someone to act in accordance with some 
conception of the good she does not endorse, cannot make her life go 
better for her. Gyekye (1997), along with communitarians like Sandel 
(1982:152) emphasizes capacity building -  particularly a capacity for 
agency, which requires positive liberty and self-knowledge. Capacity 
building, in the relevant sense, is done as subjects of a cultural matrix, 
through a process of moral socialization. “We can know a good in 
common that we cannot know alone” (Sandel, 1982:183). Capacity
19 I shall not discus Mill's view at this point because it is not directly relevant here.
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building, in Gyekye, underwrites the need to protect the cultural context 
within which the common good is realized -  the values of “freedom, 
respect, dignity, security and satisfaction” (Gyekye, 1997:46). The 
second-tier of shared meanings and understandings which constitute the 
socio-political identity of the state -  as distinct from the communocultural 
groups which make it up -  underwrite these values as rights to which 
individuals bear title, but without falling victim to a fallacy Young (1990: 
165) draws attention to -  the so-called “group-neutral human capacity for 
self-making”.
3.2.2.2 Second-tier solidarity
Gyekye’s notion of a weakly unified political culture consist of a second- 
tier20 of shared meanings and understandings, which is in effect a 
second-tier solidarity. It is now time to give a sense to what the notion 
entails. Second-tier solidarity is a force for socio-political integration. It 
can accommodate the group consciousness of communocultural 
matrices in ways which negates difference as otherness, “exclusive 
opposition” (Young, 1990:171), and affirms it as “specificity, variation, 
heterogeneity” (Young, 1990:171). Thus understood, difference is 
conceived as relational, which relativizes the positions of various groups, 
priviledged and oppressed, and understanding of difference is con- 
textualized, which undermines essentialist assumptions about identity 
(Young, 1990:171). Relativization and contextualization of the meaning 
of group identity leads to its revision: “what makes a group a group is a 
social process of interaction and differentiation in which ... people come 
to have a particular affinity tor others” (Young, 1990:172). Membership 
across group boundaries then becomes possible: membership is “the 
affirmation of that affinity by other members of the group, and the 
attribution of membership in that group by persons identifying with other 
groups” (Young, 1990:172), making possible “overlapping experiences” 
(Young, 1990:171) between groups. Groups, then, share in the specificity 
of other groups. Second-tier solidarity arises from multiple group
Metanatlonality, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights ...___________
20 Gyekye’s distinction between first and second-tier solidarity corresponds to Van der 
Merwe's (1999:316) distinction between thin and thick multicultural societies. “With 
thin multiculturalism is meant societies in which the cultural differences which are 
claimed as rights are embedded in a greater (political) culture, a liberal democratic 
culture or a culture of universal human rights in which a consensus exists about the 
right to differences as, for example, has been the case in Belgium until recently. Thick 
multicultural societies refers to societies, like Israel, wherein certain of the cultural 
differences which are claimed as rights, undermine a general acknowledgement of the 
right to difference, for example, when what is demanded is the right to a non- 
democratic political system, or the prohibition of religious freedom, freedom of speech 
and so forth".
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identifications, which allows group differences to cut across social 
groups, i.e. collectives which have affinity with one another because of a 
set of practices or way of life and which differentiate themselves from 
other groups according to these cultural forms (Young, 1990:186). 
Difference, then is a “side-by-side particularity neither reducible to 
[essentialist] identity nor completely other” (Young, 1990:238-239).
In this public realm generality -  the perspective of a general standpoint 
attained through consensus (Gyekye, 1997:130-131, 139-141), is not 
attained by the exclusion of particularity. Particularity should be captured 
in decision-making procedures -  “as far as is feasible” (Gyekye, 1997: 
139), i.e. the “supermajority” (Gyekye, 1997:140) of consensus must be 
given preference over the simple majority of majoritarian systems to 
prevent a situation from arising in which “the interest of minority groups 
may eternally be ignored or not adequately protected” (Gyekye, 1997: 
139). Rather, generality is a function of real participatory structures in 
which content-full persons assert their perspectives on social issues 
within consensually driven institutions that encourage the representation 
of their distinct voices. The need for consensually driven institutions is 
given by the social ideal of solidarity (Gyekye’s “supermajority”), and by 
the need to prevent dominant groups from articulating the “common 
good” in terms influenced by their particular perspectives and interests 
(Gyekye, 1997:130-131).
Consensus is, of course, the cement of social integration in Gyekye’s 
order of things. It represents, as Eze (1997:313) points out, a “return to 
the source” move, an attempt to order morality and politics in Africa along 
traditional lines. Gyekye and Wiredu are here in accord. Wiredu 
(1996:173) refers to the traditional ordering mechanism as a “culture of 
consensus” -  a “deference to the common good” not inconsistent with 
dissent. A return to tradition would inspire a modern indigenous form of 
African consensual democracy, connecting post-colonial Africa with its 
pre-colonial past. The advantages of this would be twofold: a sharing 
with every constituency the exercise of governing power, and a sub­
stantive representation for even the smallest constituency. This re­
presents one answer to the all important question: “How to safeguard the 
rights of the minority parties who did not ’win’ the election" (Eze, 
1997:313 -  paraphrasing Wiredu).
Now, the strength of consensus, as presented by Gyekye and Wiredu, 
boils down to the “will to consensus”, which, as Eze (1997:317) notes, 
may be interpreted in two ways: the idea that “human beings have the 
ability eventually to cut through their differences to the rock bottom 
identity of interest ‘through rational discussions’” in either a belief in the 
power of reason or an African belief in the power of their belief “in a
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shared and common past and future” that leads them to pursue reason 
as a means of realizing the favoured shared life-form. Eze (1997:318­
319) thinks the latter weighs heavily with Gyekye and Wiredu. They tend 
to conflate the “conflictual” with the “irrational” and the “rational” with the 
“consensual”, and this conflation is clearly a cultural bias for harmony 
over conflict, i.e. for a politics of the common good over a politics of 
difference and individualism. There is not “much self-evident truth” (Eze, 
1997:320) in the notion that the favoured ordering mechanism of Akan 
society is a universal preference, one that can be teased from some 
analysis of the human condition.
Eze (1997:320-321), agreeing with Gyekye (1997:101-106, 133-140), 
argues that the mixed “multi-party” alternative to democracy (mixed in the 
sense of containing consensual and majoritarian elements) is a post­
colonial response to “conflicts that necessarily arise from the necessarily 
competitive nature of individuated identities and desires” (Eze, 1997: 
320). Wiredu's idea of “agreed actions without agreed notions” cannot be 
the goal of multi-party democracy, “but only one of its [albeit privileged] 
moments” (Eze, 1997:320), “the initial, formal agreement to play by a set 
of rules that allows ... respect of dissent as much as its opposite” (Eze, 
1997:321). A truly democratic (political) culture is one that “reconciles 
both centripetal and centrifugal political forces” (Eze, 1997:321), i.e. one 
which balances considerations of the public good against individuated 
disagreements and oppositional activities, understanding itself as “a 
market place of competing -  not just consenting or consensing -  ideas” 
(Eze, 1997:321). Modernity calls for a rights-based state, one which 
either upholds individuals rights as trumps, or finds some reconciliation 
between individuals and groups as right-bearers, as Gyekye attempts to 
do.
Second-tier solidarity, then, pursues the ideal of a heterogeneous public. 
The interplay between internal and external limits to the violation of 
liberty determines a certain conception of the public realm: it is not a 
unity transcending group differences but rather a unity-in-diversity; the 
differences needed for identity construction remain unassimilated at the 
level of the social group in the sense in which social groups are first-tier 
solidarity groups. But the multi-dimensional aspect of membership of 
first-tier identifying groups, and the concomitant multidimensional identity 
construction which this makes possible, give rise to second-tier solidarity. 
Private life, in contradistinction to public life, then becomes a part of a 
person's life which she chooses -  with justification -  to withdraw from
Metanationality, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights ...___________
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public view (Young, 1990:119-120)21. Even if Gyekye’s distinction 
between the private and the public realms is a social distinction, then this 
option is possible within one part -  the private part -  of the division. This 
too is a consequence of the internal-external tensions that arise from the 
need to limit liberty.
The picture of private and public agency that emerges here is possible, 
Gyekye thinks, if the state intervenes in the interest of capacity building. 
Capacity building is a procedure for empowerment. And empowerment, 
in turn, is a procedure for ensuring effective agency, understood as a 
level of participation at which citizens can reasonably expect to influence 
the outcomes of deliberation. Participation at this level, the minimum of 
public agency, is a necessary condition of the possibility of moral 
revision. There are two sufficient conditions, one relating to history, the 
other to individual prowess.
Cultural contacts may lead an individual to think and act outside his 
history22... The historical emergence of moral visionaries or idealists in 
societies is an eloquent testimony that the moral hands of (some) 
individuals are not tied by the communal structure (Gyekye, 1997:60).
Gyekye (1997), along with Kernohan (1998) and Ryan (1989), proposes 
a strategy under which the state uses its power to advocate reform, 
challenge false beliefs about morality, and ensure that no one falls below 
the minimum level required for effective political participation. Gyekye 
(1997:140-141) sees this strategy as entailed by his “comprehensive 
conception of democracy”. “The comprehensive conception of 
democracy will be the kind that is likely to espouse the politics of the 
common good, the politics that aims at promoting a set of fundamental 
goods or interests held as essential to basic human flourishing” (Gyekye, 
1997:142).
Gyekye’s paternalism preempts some options by structuring particular 
ranges of choice. This may prevent some people from “influencing the 
shared moral environment” (Dworkin, 1993:41) because the structures 
needed for the realizations of their goods are not available. This, how­
ever, does not mean that they cannot create those structures by
21 The political institutions of second-tier solidarity do not “differentiate citizens" (Young, 
1990:173). In this sense the social and identifying groups to which individuals belong 
are submerged in the public domain.
22 Bernstein (1991:91) offers an explanation of the possibility of transacculturated moral 
truth, in the ,,core”-sense Gyekye has in mind. He says: “a given tradition may 
contingently turn out to be rationally superior to all its rivals “as a consequence of the 
power of the culture which sp.j ■ ris the tradition, or some other contingent reason".
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exploiting the possibilities of revision. The challenges faced by these 
people may be more arduous than others who are content with their 
moral environment, but this does not deny them equality of access to 
shaping that environment; formally, equality of access is denied to no- 
one, but there may be substantive differences, differences in material 
well-being, which give some an advantage over others, and which 
Gyekye attempts to combat by guaranteeing a minimum to ensure 
effective participation. Gyekye’s position in this regard is comparable to 
Ryan’s “exercisable rights” (Ryan, 1989:162)23. So Gyekye combines a 
laissez-faire strategy (Kernohan, 1998:91) which confines state inter­
vention to securing the basic conditions of equal basic liberties and 
material equality (favoured by Dworkin, 1990 and Kymlicka, 1989), with 
the “advocacy” strategy (Kernohan, 1998:91) which entitles the state to 
structure the moral-political domain indirectly through its capacity building 
programmes.
4. From Ghana with love
It is instructive to note that the new South African constitution is firmly 
committed to the liberal concept of individual rights and that this 
commitment secures for many people a route from tribally grounded 
identities to wider collective identities, particularly a South African 
identity. Individual rights are also of critical importance in making space 
for choice in the issue of personal identity in that they serve as a public 
affirmation of the right to choose one’s membership of identifying groups. 
The idea that a choice is possible is in part a function of the growing 
consciousness that it is possible to separate one’s individual identity 
from one’s social identity. But while affirming the right to choose, the 
constitution fails to make positive provision for this right to be exercised. 
It fails to equip the state with the power legitimately to promote a culture 
of pluralism, thus remaining passive in an area where active initiatives 
are needed. Such initiatives are valuable to offset some of the negative 
consequences of enforced membership at a time when it is becoming 
increasingly obvious that the monocultural (i.e. monoracial) identifications 
to which people were subjected on grounds of birth during the apartheid 
era underwrote not only a false view of the self, but also of the nature 
and value of identifying groups. The constitution remains silent on the 
issue of “groups” or “communities” (no doubt for fear of the “neo­
apartheid” label), but in doing so disables the cause of democratic 
pluralism.
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For South Africa three important lessons are available.
• The relationship between first- and second-tier solidarity
The first concerns the relationship between first- and second-tier 
solidarity. At second-tier solidarity citizens are not differentiated. But 
individuals’ first-tier communocultural groups, the groups with whom they 
identify, are morally significant and therefore differentiated, and this is 
because membership of these groups is the source of loyalty to the 
political institutions which impact on their lives at the level of second-tier 
solidarity. If Gyekye is right, the kind of constitutional loyalty that he 
attempts to promote at this level is as far as one might push events on a 
continent still steeped in loyalties to ethnocultural groups. It is instructive 
to note that Gyekye’s distinction between first- and second-tier solidarity 
corresponds to Van der Merwe’s (1999:316) distinction between thin and 
thick multicultural societies.
With thin multiculturalism is meant societies in which the cultural 
differences which are claimed as rights are embedded in a greater 
(political) culture, a liberal democratic culture or a culture of universal 
human rights in which a consensus exists about the right to differences 
as, for example, has been the case in Belgium until recently. Thick 
multicultural societies refers to societies, like Israel, wherein certain of 
the cultural differences which are claimed as rights, undermine a 
general acknowledgment of the right to difference, for example, when 
what is demanded is the right to a non-democratic political system, or 
the prohibition of religious freedom, freedom of speech and so forth.
First-tier solidarity is of the “thick” kind; second-tier solidarity is of the 
“thin” kind.
• The use of state-backed social and economic rights
My second point concerns the use of state-backed social and economic 
rights as backup rights for effective use of political rights. Gyekye 
accepts the view that money does not lose its class specificity, i.e. it 
sustains a “self-reproducing class system” (Ryan, 1989:29). Ultimately 
the problem is due to the fact that the doctrine of rights in the West is 
welded to an individualist model of the social good in which the right to 
personhood grew up historically in conjunction with the right to property 
(Ryan, 1989:152). It is not difficult to see what impact the project of 
modernity in its liberal pluralist form have had in South Africa. Money and 
its concomitant social power differentiations, translated into political 
power, had elevated a white intelligentsia to the status of managers of a 
capitalist economic system which required labour exploitation as a 
necessary and rational feature of its operations. If Ryan is right, 
modernity’s attempts to address the social problems which have
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developed in the wake of differential patterns of distribution tend to 
assimilate difference and marginalize historical identities. This is a 
source of serious social tension. The problem is clearly that the open 
market favours those who hold the advantages, irrespective of how those 
advantages have been accumlated..
Like Gyekye, Ryan thinks the self needs to be reconceptualized. In the 
multicultural society there is no space for a non-relational self, and by 
implication, no space for non-relational action in civic or civil society. The 
self, then, must cease to be an owner for whom rights are property. If this 
be granted, the right to equal treatment becomes inseparable from its 
institutional context, and the “interrelational character of social wealth” 
(Ryan, 1989:117) and hence inseparable from material equality. So the 
doctrine of rights become a doctrine of exercisable rights” (Ryan, 
1989:162). Only a state assisted capacity building programme can 
ensure that this outcome is achieved. And achieving this outcome is 
essential to the construction of second-tier solidarity.
• The need for equity between regions
The last point touches on the need for equity between regions. Thornton 
(1996:154) believes rightly that the metropolitan regions of South Africa 
are affluent compared to the rural-traditional regions. “South Africa is a 
country stretched as thin as a sheet over three points of power and 
wealth.” They are Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, veritable “city- 
states, not just cities” (Thornton, 1996:154), “each with its own identity 
and allegiances” (Thornton, 1996:154). It is only recently, notes Thornton 
(1996:157), that a universal politics in which “all persons are the primary 
units” have been established. But in this set-up the inhabitants of the 
metropolitan regions have all the advantages, economic and political. At 
least what they lack by way of direct political clout, they make up by way 
of economic influence disproportionate to their numbers. Social inte­
gration around the idea of a shared constitutional dispensation -  a 
constitutional patriotism -  which is a feature of Gyekye’s second-tier 
solidarity, will not be achieved if the means to exercising political rights, 
means beyond the present political poverty line, remains insufficient and 
beyond reach.
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